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INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 2001, the United States Congress adopted a joint
resolution authorizing the President to use "all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the terrorist attacks that killed
nearly 3,000 people in New York City, Washington, D.C., and rural
Pennsylvania a week earlier.' Acting pursuant to this authorization,
United States military forces initiated combat operations in Afghanistan
in October 2001.2 These operations were directed against both the al
* The author is director of academic support at the University of Iowa College of
Law, an adjunct lecturer in international studies at the University of Iowa, and a director
of the Innocence Project of Iowa. He received his J.D. from the University of Iowa in
1998 and his LL.M. in International Human Rights Law from the National University of
Ireland, Galway, in 2002.
1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
2. See David Rhode and Norimitsu Onishi, A Nation Challenged: Last Stronghold;
Taliban Abandon Last Stronghold; Omar is Not Found, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 8, 2001, at Al.
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Qaeda terrorist network and Afghanistan's Taliban government, which,
in the determination of the President, had supported al Qaeda.3
During the course of these operations, scores of individuals were
captured by American and allied forces and initially detained in
Afghanistan.4 In early 2002, the United States began transferring
detainees to a naval base at Guantidnamo Bay, Cuba.5 Identified as al
Qaeda and Taliban prisoners, these detainees were neither recognized as
prisoners of war, nor were charged with any crime. 6 Military law experts
suggested that the reason the Bush Administration chose Guantdnamo
Bay was to set up an argument that United States civilian courts lacked
jurisdiction over the detainees since the facility is located on territory
leased from Cuba.7
The United States government announced that detainees would be
tried before military commissions established by the President.8 Such
tribunals had last been utilized sixty years earlier, following World War
11. 9 In the face of expansive executive powers and the legal uncertainties
regarding their status, detainees began mounting legal challenges to their
detention and to trial by a military commission.' 0  In addition to
arguments based on domestic law, the detainees raised arguments
invoking international law, particularly by claiming individual rights
under international humanitarian law."'
While claims based on international humanitarian law are not
foreign to United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, they are relatively
rare. Most Supreme Court cases addressing international humanitarian
law predate the extensive codification of that body of law in the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 12  The Guantdmamo Bay detainee cases have
3. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to Joint Session of Congress
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
4. See Steven Lee Myers, A Nation Challenged: In the South; Anticipating Many
Captives, U.S. Marines Build a Prison Camp at Kandahar Airport, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2001, at lB.
5. See Steve Vogel, Afghan Prisoners Going to Gray Area: Military Unsure What
Follows Transfer to U.S. Base in Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at Al.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Katharine Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Military Tribunals; Government
Sets Rules for Military on War Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at Al. See also
Military Order-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
9. See id.
10. See infra Parts III-IV.
11. See id.
12. Before 2000, only two United States Supreme Court cases referred to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, both in the context of juvenile executions. See Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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provided one of the few situations in which federal courts have
consistently been faced with claims that international humanitarian law
grants individual rights. Thus, the detainee cases provide an important
illustration of how the American federal courts have interpreted and
applied international humanitarian law guarantees.
This article will examine the application and enforcement of
international humanitarian law by the United States federal courts. Part I
begins with a look at the status of international law in American law;
particularly the legal effect of treaties. Part II reviews the Supreme
Court's past international humanitarian law decisions. The limits
presented by domestic law and international human rights law, in the
detainee cases, will be addressed in Part III. Part IV examines how
international humanitarian law has been applied in the Supreme Court's
Guantdinamo Bay detainee cases. Finally, Part V considers the status of
international humanitarian law in federal jurisprudence and prospects for
its future use to guarantee individuals rights.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AMERICAN LAW
In order to appreciate the application of international humanitarian
law in the United States courts, it is important to understand the place of
international law in the American legal system. It is also critical to
examine the manner in which courts have applied those international
provisions, which guarantee individual rights.
"International law is part of our law" declared the United States
Supreme Court over a century ago. 13 The United States Constitution
specifies that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.... 4 This unequivocal statement incorporates into federal law all
conventional law to which the United States is a party. The Constitution
requires individual states to respect treaty law, and invalidates any state
law to the contrary.1 5
The body of international law incorporated into American law goes
beyond that contained in treaties, known as conventional international
law. The common law inherited by the United States from England also
included customary international law,16 which is based on state
13. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (applying international law to
determine that coastal fishing vessels captured off Cuba are not subject to confiscation as
prizes of war).
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
15. See id.
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., pt. 1,
ch. 2, intro, note (1987).
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practice.1 7  While not expressly mentioned in the Constitution like
conventional international law, the Supreme Court has made clear that
customary international law is equally a part of federal law.' 8 Thus, it
may be invoked once its existence is established.
It would seem to follow that international law, whether conventional
or customary, may be relied on in American courts to the same extent
and with the same effect as domestic law. However, this is often not the
case under a principle known as "non-self-execution." 19 This judicial
hurdle routinely serves as a bar to the use of conventional international
law in American courts.2°
The non-self-execution doctrine holds that a treaty does not create
individually enforceable rights unless it is found to be self-executing.2'
In an 1829 case, the Supreme Court found that a treaty between Spain
and the United States could not be judicially enforced because it did not
create present rights, but only obligated Congress to take future action.22
Thus, the treaty was not "self-executing" because it required
implementing legislation.
The non-self execution doctrine has generated controversy because,
over time, a presumption against self-execution arose in the federal
courts' application of the doctrine. The Supreme Court recently
underscored this presumption, citing a lower court for the proposition
that while treaties "may comprise international commitments... they are
not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing
statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing'
and is ratified on these terms. 23 Commentators have noted that federal
courts employ "generalized intent inquiries" to determine whether
Congress intended enforceability.24
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (8th ed. 2004).
18. See Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. The Court in Paquette Habana
explained that "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations." Id.
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., pt. 1,
ch. 2, § 111(4) (1987).
20. Aya Gruber, Who's Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1017 (2007).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., pt. I,
ch. 2, § 111(4) (1987).
22. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 254 (1829).
23. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (quoting Igartia-De La Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (2005)). The American Law Institute's restatement
reads that a treaty is non-self-executing if it manifests an intention that it not be effective
without implementing legislation or if Congress requires implementing legislation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 111(4) (1987).
24. Gruber, supra note 20, at 1050. Gruber argues the presumption of non-self-
execution is the result of unchecked lower-court activism and reveals isolationist
influences. Id.
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Under this interpretation of the non-self execution doctrine, an
individual seeking to rely on a treaty provision has been required to
demonstrate that Congress intended for provisions of a treaty to be
judicially enforceable. 25 Right or wrong, this interpretation has acted as
an impediment to individuals attempting to invoke international
conventional law in American courts.2 6 In the words of one scholar, the
doctrine has served as "an impenetrable barrier" to the enforcement of
treaty rights by individuals in the federal courts. 27  Thus, while the
Supreme Court has occasionally considered guarantees of individual
rights contained in conventional international law to assist in its
interpretation of domestic law,28 such rights have not been successfully
invoked on behalf of individuals in the federal courts.29
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S PAST LAW OF WAR CASES
The use of international law by the United States Supreme Court
has included reliance on international humanitarian law. The Court
recognized the existence of the common law of war early in the nation's
history. 30 At the dawn of the 19th century, the Court observed that the
authorization of hostilities by Congress causes "the general laws of war
to apply to [the] situation., 31
The Court's earliest law of war cases involved the capture of ships
on the high seas. The customary law of war was the controlling law
governing the forfeiture of ships and condemnation of cargo. The Court
repeatedly applied the law of war to prize cases from its early days
25. See id.
26. Seeid. at 1019.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-79 (2005) (a case involving
juvenile death penalty).
29. See, e.g., Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (stating that the judgment of International
Court of Justice regarding Vienna Convention is non-self-executing); Pierre v. Gonzales,
502 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2nd Cir. 2007) (stating that the U.N. Convention Against Torture
is non-self-executing); Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 404, n. 3 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating
that the U.N. Convention Against Torture is non-self-executing); Beazley v. Johnson, 242
F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is non-self-executing).
30. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 279 (1796).
31. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
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through the War of 1812,32 the U.S. Civil War,33 and the Spanish-
American War.
34
The Court's use of this body of law increased as it was forced to
apply the law of war to a wider range of property claims as a result of
military campaigns during the 19th century. The destruction or
confiscation of property by military forces was frequently justified or
nullified based on the customary law of war.
35
The United States' Civil War presented more challenging questions
about the scope of military authority and the law of occupation. The
Court again turned to the customary law of war for guidance in these
cases. In New Orleans v. The Steamship Company36 the Court observed
that under the law of war, the conquering power has the right to displace
the previous authority and exercise all necessary functions of
government.37
In one line of cases, the Court addressed the military's authority to
establish courts with jurisdiction over civilian matters. In Mechanics'
and Traders' Bank v. Union Bank,38 the Court noted that the law of war
permits, by necessity, the establishment of military courts in occupied
territory.39  However, the law of war superseded statutory and
constitutional law only in the rebellious states. Thus, in Ex parte
32. See generally The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 100 (1819) (holding that an
American ship trading with the enemy was subject to capture and forfeit).
33. See generally The Hampton, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 372 (1867) (holding that the
statute was not intended to supplant law of war regarding capture of ship); The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (stating that the law of war justifies the capture of
ships in service of enemy).
34. See generally Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (stating that coastal fishing
vessels are exempt from capture under the law of war); The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S.
568 (1900) (applying the law of capture to a ship).35. See generally Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558 (1912) (applying law of
war and permitting seizure of vessel for military use despite surrender of Cuba); Juragua
Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909) (stating that the destruction of an
American factory in Cuba was justified by law of war); Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594
(1878) (stating that law of war prevents claim against Confederate commander's
destruction of cotton to prevent its seizure by Federal forces); Titus v. United States, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 475 (1874) (holding that public property of enemy becomes conqueror's
property); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871) (holding that enemy
property is subject to condemnation under laws of war); United States v. Reading, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 1 (1856) (stating that an individual enlisting in U.S. Army does not forfeit
property in enemy territory); United State v. Guillem, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 47 (1851)
(strictly construing the law of war in prohibiting the confiscation of personal property of
a neutral citizen on an enemy ship).
36. See New Orleans v. The Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387 (1874).
37. See id. at 394.
38. See Mechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276
(1874).
39. See id. at 295-96.
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Milligan,40 the Court held that military courts had no jurisdiction over a
41
civilian in a loyal state where the civilian courts remained open.
The Court has also addressed the power of the military to try its
own personnel. Coleman v. Te.-nessee42 held that under the customary
law of war a court martial possesses jurisdiction to try a soldier of its
own army in occupied territory. 3 The Court confirmed that those
military offenses not covered by statute are punishable under the law of
war. an The Court also relied on the law of war for the proposition that
military personnel are not subject to civil jurisdiction in enemy
territory.4
The Court's use of the law of war expanded again during World
War II. Previously, the Court had applied the customary law of war.
Now, the Court was presented with its first opportunities to consider
conventional humanitarian law. In addition, in its review of prosecutions
for war crimes, the Court would encounter assertions of individual rights
grounded in international humanitarian law.
In Ex parte Quirin,46 eight German-born residents of the United
States challenged their trial for war crimes by a military commission. 47
The Court found that Congress had the authority to establish military
commissions to try violations of the law of war, and validly incorporated
the law of war into the legislation. 48 The Court referred to the Hague
Regulations49 and to customary law to conclude that the petitioners
failure to wear "fixed and distinctive emblems" when entering the
country surreptitiously to commit hostile acts rendered them "unlawful
belligerents" in violation of the law of war.50 As such, the eight German-
born residents were properly tried before military commissions.
5
'
40. See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
41. See id. at 123.
42. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1879).
43. See id. at 517.
44. See Exparte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 249 (1863).
45. See Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 170 (1879).
46. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
47. Seeid. at 18-19.
48. See id. at 30-31.
49. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
annex, Oct. 18, 1907, U.S.T.S. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
50. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 34-35.
51. See id. at 41-46. The Court added this disclaimer: "We have no occasion now to
define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military
tribunals to try persons according to the law of war." Id. at 45-46. See also Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (stating the law of war justified trial by military
commission for a spouse of service member in Germany).
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In In re Yamashita52 and Johnson v. Eisentrager,53 petitioners
accused of violations of the law of war challenged their trial by military
commission. These cases marked the Court's most extensive
engagement with conventional humanitarian law, although it only
constituted a small portion of each opinion. 54 First, the Court referred to
the Hague Regulations to find that petitioners had been accused of
recognized war crimes.5' Second, among many other arguments, the
Court considered challenges to the validity of the military commission
proceedings based on the Geneva Convention of 1929.56
Both Yamashita, a Japanese general, and the Eisentrager petitioners
invoked the same two Geneva Convention articles.57 The first article
required notification of the protecting power before judicial proceedings
against a prisoner of war,58 while the second specified that "sentence
shall only be pronounced on a prisoner of war by the same tribunals and
in accordance with the same procedure as in the case of persons
belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Power.
' 59
The Court rejected the argument in both cases, finding that the
specified articles only applied to trial for infractions committed while a
prisoner of war, and not to trial for war crimes committed prior to
capture. 60 It is worth noting, however, that the Court addressed the
Geneva Convention claims directly, using its own terms to determine it
did not apply to the petitioners' trials. 61 The Court's consideration of the
enforceability of the Convention was limited to a footnote in Eisentrager
stating that "responsibility for observance and enforcement of these
rights is upon political and military authorities. Rights of alien enemies
are vindicated under it only through protests and intervention of
protecting powers. 62
This review of the United States Supreme Court's past humanitarian
law cases shows that the Court has primarily engaged with customary
humanitarian law. Most of these cases have involved the proper
disposition of property or the scope of military authority. Only in its
World War II cases did the Court encounter conventional humanitarian
52. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
53. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
54. See id.; Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1.
55. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 15-16; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 787-88.
56. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929,
118 L.N.T.S 343.
57. See id. at arts. 60, 63.
58. See id. at art. 60.
59. Id. at art. 63.
60. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20-24; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789-90.
62 See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 37; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789.
62. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789, n. 14.
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law and claims of specific individual rights granted by treaty. However,
neither the Yamashita nor Eisentrager Court directly analyzed whether
the Geneva Convention of 1929 was self-executing.6 3
III. THE LIMITS OF DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
The American response to the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001,
was far-reaching, resulting in a military campaign in Afghanistan and an
even wider-ranging "war or terrorism" around the globe. One
consequence of these actions was the detention of hundreds of people,
many of whom vigorously protested their innocence, at a United States
naval base in Cuba. In the words of one scholar, the decision to hold
detainees at Guantdnamo Bay was made "primarily on the calculation
that the government could operate in a sphere of lawlessness there."
64
Declassified documents show that lawyers for the United States
government provided an opinion on- access to American courts just
before the transfer of detainees began.65 In a December 28, 2001, memo,
Justice Department lawyers concluded that federal courts did not have
jurisdiction over Guantdnamo Bay detainees.66  Justice Department
lawyers interpreted Eisentrager to hold that federal courts had no
jurisdiction over persons outside the sovereignty of the United States.
67
Even though the 1903 lease agreement for Guantdinamo Bay gave the
United States "complete jurisdiction and control," the lawyers concluded
that federal courts had no jurisdiction over detainees because the
agreement reserved ultimate sovereignty to Cuba.6 s
The United States government's position was challenged by
detainees via habeas corpus proceedings. In its 2004 opinion in Rasul v.
63. See generally Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.
64. Gerald L. Neuman, The Military Commissions Act and the Detainee Debacle: A
Response, 48 HARV. INT'L. L.J. ONLINE 33 (2007), available at
http://www.harvardilj.org/attach.php?id=100.
65. See Memorandum from Patrick Philbin and John Yoo, Dep. Asst. Atty's Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Possible
Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba 1 (Dec. 28, 2001)
[hereinafter Memo of Dec. 28, 2001], available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/01.12.28.pdf.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 3. The Eisentrager Court's relevant finding was that the petitioners
were never in sovereign territory of the United States that the scenes of their offense,
capture, trial, and punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any federal
court. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778. The Department of Justice memo stated that
there is no distinction between sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction, reasoning that the
latter must be based on the former. See Memo of Dec. 28, 2001, supra note 65, at 3.
68. See Memo of Dec. 28, 2001 supra note 65, at 3. The Justice Department also
asserted that no court was granted jurisdiction by statute. Id. at 5.
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Bush,69 the Supreme Court rejected the government's position, holding
that non-citizen detainees at Guantdnamo Bay were entitled to access to
the civilian courts of the United States.7° Subsequent legislation to deny
detainees such access 7' was held by the Court to be unconstitutional in
Boumediene v. Bush.72
Gaining access to American civilian courts, however, is a hollow
victory if no meaningful procedural or substantive law exists. Although
it granted detainees access to courts, the Court noted that its opinion
"[did] not address the content of the law that governs petitioners'
detention. 73 Instead, the Court observed that "[i]n considering both the
procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent
acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political
branches.
74
The procedural and substantive law applicable to the Guantdnamo
Bay detainees was quite limited.75 Many of the protections found in the
United States Constitution do not extent to persons held outside of the
76country. The Supreme Court had previously held that such
fundamental constitutional guarantees as the right to a jury trial and the
prohibition against warrantless searches should not be applied
extraterritorially. 77  Based on such precedents, a military commission
69. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
70. See id. at 552.
71. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 amended 28 U.S.C. §2241, governing
the remedy of habeas corpus, to provide that:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36
(2006). The Act also established a system of military commissions to try enemy
combatants. See generally id.
72. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008). The Court invalidated
that portion of the Act purporting to strip federal courts of all jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus petitions from Guantinamo Bay detainees. See id. at 2270-72. The Court held
that this provision violated the "Suspension Clause" of the constitution. See id. at 2274.
The Suspension Clause provides that "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
73. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
74. Id. at 2276.
75. See id. at 2260-65.
76. See id. at 2259.
77. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 149 (1904) (finding that an American
citizen in the Philippine Islands, then in U.S. possession, was not entitled to a jury trial);
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment was not applicable to the search of a Mexican citizen being tried in U.S.
courts when the search occurred in Mexico).
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ruled in the case of one detainee that the right against self-incrimination
found in the Fifth Amendment of the constitution does not apply
extraterritorially.78 The Hamdan ruling serves as a reminder that despite
relying on the U.S. Constitution to open the doors of the courtroom, the
Supreme Court might not clothe everyone who enters with the full
protection of the U.S. Constitution.
If limitations existed on constitutional rights, then it must be
admitted that domestic statutory law provided even less protection to
detainees. The procedural and substantive provisions of statutory law
can be repealed and amended by Congress at any time. 9 Indeed,
Congress demonstrated its willingness to enact laws altering the legal
framework for Guantdnamo Bay detainees through the Detainee
Treatment Act of 200580 and the Military Commission Act of 2006.81
Numerous procedural and substantive provisions of international
human rights law were arguably applicable to Guantdnamo Bay
detainees, including portions of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights82 and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.83 However,
upon ratification of both instruments, the U.S. Senate declared that the
substantive articles "are not self-executing. ' '84  Under the doctrine of
non-self-execution,85 this expression of legislative intent renders a treaty
judicially unenforceable in American courts.
It should be recognized that the doctrine of non-self-execution is
controversial, even as a matter of domestic law. Moreover, as a party to
a treaty, a nation is legally obligated to comply with its terms even if the
treaty does not create enforceable rights at the local level.86 However,
without diminishing the legal obligation on the United States to comply
78. See United States v. Hamdan, No. D-029 & D-044, at 121 (Mil. Comm'n. Rep.
July 20, 2008), available at http://www.nimj.org/documents/reporter-june%2019-i.pdf.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
80. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-
2745 (2005).
81. Military Commission Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600.
82. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
83. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
84. See U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CONG. REC.
S17486-01 (daily ed., Oct. 27, 1990) available at http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/
tortres.html; U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REc. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992)
available at http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html.
85. For a discussion of the non-self-execution legal doctrine, see supra text
accompanying notes 13-29.
86. See Gruber, supra note 20, at 1041.
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
with treaties to which it is a party, it is clear that the relevant provisions
of international human rights law cannot be enforced by American courts
upon individual petition. As a practical matter, therefore, international
human rights law provided no meaningful protection under the domestic
legal system.
Given these circumstances, the domestic law of the United States
offered little in terms of a guaranteed legal framework for the detainees.
Uncertainty existed as to the availability of constitutional rights.
Statutory law was amended by Congress to allow questionable practices
such as the admission of hearsay in military commission trials.
87
Moreover, the relevant international human rights law was not judicially
enforceable in United States courts under the non-self execution
doctrine.
88
Against the backdrop of this legal vacuum, the United States
Supreme Court encountered a version of international humanitarian law
that evolved in important ways since the World War II era. The body of
humanitarian law had been enlarged and enhanced by the adoption of the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949.89 As one commentator noted, the last
century saw a "universal recognition that the protection of human dignity
is a proper concern of international law."90 This was reflected in the shift
from the language of state obligations and prohibitions to a more rights-
based language. 9' How, then, has the Court applied this enhanced body
of law to the Guantinamo Bay detainee cases?
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR IN THE DETAINEE CASES
After detentions at Guantdnamo Bay began in 2002, numerous legal
challenges were filed by or on behalf of detainees. The United States
Supreme Court decided five cases dealing with detainee rights.92 Two of
87. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. at 2608-09.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
89. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)
[hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1950).
90. John Cerone, Misplaced Reliance on the "Law of War, " 14 NEW ENG. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 57, 70 (2007).
91. See id. at 71.
92. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2229; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426 (2004).
[Vol. 28:2
2009] APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 189
these cases involved claims based on provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention.93
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld involved an American citizen captured in
Afghanistan who was alleged to have fought for the Taliban. 94 Yaser
Hamdi was transferred to Guantidnamo Bay and instituted habeas corpus
proceedings.95 Among other claims, he asserted that his detention was
unlawful under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention.96
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, which requires a
determination by a "competent tribunal" when a person's status as a
prisoner of war is in doubt,97 had been rejected by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit on the basis that the Convention was not self-
executing.98 In its opinion, the Supreme Court plurality held that Hamdi
was entitled to a hearing, but it did not reach the Article 5 claim.99
Instead, the Court based its decision on constitutional grounds. 00
The plurality did consider international humanitarian law, but in an
indirect manner.10 1 The Court cited the Third Geneva Convention as
authority for the principle that "detention may last no longer than active
hostilities" before determining that active combat was ongoing.0 2 The
Court also cited Ex parte Quirin in its recognition of the category
"enemy combatants" as belligerents who fail to comply with the law of
war. 103
The Hamdi Court did not, however, apply international
humanitarian law to determine whether Hamdi had, in fact, violated that
law.10 4 Nor did it provide any real analysis of the relationship between
international law and domestic law.105  One analysis of the opinion
laments the missed opportunity "[i]nstead of confronting international
humanitarian law, with all its limitations, the Supreme Court appears in
Hamdi to have embarked on a questionable path toward creating its own,
new constitutional common law of war, ungrounded either in
93. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507.
94. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
95. Id. at 510-11.
96. See id. at 515.
97. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 89, at art. 5.
98. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468-69 (4th Cir. 2003).
99. See generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
100. See generally id.
101. See generally id.
102. Id. at 520. However, in his dissent, Justice Scalia rejects "reference to a treaty
and certainly not to a treaty that does not apply." Id. at 588. He opines that the courts are
bound by the political branches' determination of when hostilities end, and that the power
to detain does not end at that point in any event. Id.
103. Seeid. at 519.
104. See generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
105. See generally id.
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international humanitarian law or in any specific legislation enacted by
the U.S. Congress."'
10 6
The Court addressed international humanitarian law again in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.10 7 Like Hamdi, Salim Hamdan was captured in
Afghanistan and transferred to Guantdnamo Bay. 108 Hamdan, a Yemini
national, challenged his pending trial by military commission on two
grounds. 10 9 First, he argued that the crime with which he was charged,
conspiracy, was not a violation of the law of war.° Second, he alleged
that the military commission procedures violated military and
international law. "'
The United States District Court for the District of Colombia agreed
with Hamdan, holding that he could only be tried by military commission
under the law of war and was therefore entitled to the protections of the
Third Geneva Convention. 1 2 The United States District Court for the
District of Colombia further held that the procedures employed by the
military commission convened to try Hamdan violated both the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the Third Geneva Convention.1 3  The
government appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed on the grounds that the Geneva Conventions were not
self-executing and therefore unenforceable, and that the military
commission's procedure conformed to military law. 1
4
The Supreme Court's analysis of the validity of the military
commission began with a review of the historical use of military
commissions and the statutes alleged to support its use now. 15 Because
Congress had not specifically authorized the establishment of military
commissions, the Court had to determine whether the convening of a
military commission to try Hamdan was justified by the "Constitution
and laws, including the law of war."' 1 6 Specifically, the Court examined
whether the commissions complied with the Uniform Code of Military
106. David Coron & Jenny Martinez, International Decision: Availability of U.S.
Court to Review Decision to Hold U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatants-Executive Power
in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 787 (2004).
107. See generally Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
108. See id. at 566.
109. See id. at 567.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004).
113. See id.
114. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
115. The Court first disposed of the government's arguments that Hamdan's petition
was foreclosed by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and that the Court should abstain
from deciding the case until completion of the military commission proceedings. See
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572-91.
116. Id.at595.
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Justice, which conditioned the use of military commissions on
compliance with its own provisions and with international law, including
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.1 
7
The Court described the structure of the military commission,
observing with concern that the accused and civilian defense lawyers
could be excluded from, and precluded from learning what evidence was
presented in, any part of the proceeding deemed "closed" by the
presiding officer." 8 In addition, the commission rules permitted the
admission of any probative evidence, including hearsay and evidence
obtained through coercion.' 19 Finally, the appeal from a conviction by a
commission could be limited to review by a three-member panel, only
one member of which needed experience as a judge, with the final
determinations made by the Secretary of Defense and President.
20
The Court then analyzed the military commission under domestic
military law as codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' 2' The
Court pointed out that Article 36 of the Code places two relevant
restrictions on the President's power to make establish military
commissions.1 22 First, the procedure must "apply the principles of law
and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary
to or inconsistent with" the Code itself. 23 Second, the Code requires that
regulations for courts-martial, military commissions, and other tribunals
must be "uniform insofar as practicable.' 24 With a particular emphasis
on the rule allowing exclusion of the accused from commission
proceedings, the Court held that the military commissions violated this
article of the Code.
25
Although it had already invalidated the military commission under
domestic military law, the Court nonetheless turned to Hamdan's Geneva
Convention argument. 126 The Supreme Court acknowledged the Court of
Appeals conclusion that the Convention was not enforceable, 27 but
declared that conclusion irrelevant.' 28 There was no need to address
judicial enforceability of the Convention because Article 21 of the
117. Seeid. at613.
118. See id. at 614.
119. See id.
120. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 615.
121. See id. at 613-25.
122. See id. at 620.
123. Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836).
124. Id.
125. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624.
126. See id. at 625-35.
127. See id. at 626-27.
128. See id.
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Uniform Code of Military Justice specified that the statutory creation of
courts-martial did not deprive the jurisdiction of military commissions
under the law of war.129 The Court held that the "law of war" included
the Convention, and was applicable to Hamdan through its incorporation
into Article 21.13°
The Court declined to examine whether Hamdan was subject to the
full protection of the Third Geneva Convention due to the existence of an
armed conflict of an international character.13 1 Instead, the Court found
that even if Hamdan was not entitled to full protection, he was still
covered by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 132 Article 3
provides minimal standards of conduct even to armed conflict not
involving parties to the convention 133 and is applicable to detained
members of armed forces.134 Among other provisions, Article 3 prohibits
the "passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples."'' 35 Applying this provision of Common Article 3, the
Court found that the military commission established to try Hamdan was
not a "regularly constituted" court, and that no practical need justified
deviation from the use of courts-martial, which it considered the regular
military courts in the American system.
136
While Hamdan represented a victory for the rule of law in the
Guantdnamo Bay detainee cases, it may not represent a true victory for
international humanitarian law. The Court did not hold that the Third
129. See id. at 627-28; Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 821, art. 21
(2005).
130. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627-28.
131. See id. at 628-29. The Court of Appeals had held, in the alternative that since
Hamdan was captured in the conflict with al Qaeda the Convention was not triggered. Id.
132. See id. at 629-30.
133. Under Article 2, the full Convention applies to "two or more of the High
Contracting Parties," while Common Article 3 applies to "armed conflict not of an
international character." See Third Geneva Convention, supra note x at arts. 2 & 3. The
government argued that while Article 2 could not apply because al Qaeda was not a party
to the Convention, neither could Article 3 because the fight against al Qaeda was of an
international character. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 736. This argument was accepted by
the Court of Appeals as an alternate basis for its decision. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 41.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, relying in part on the Commentary to the
Third Geneva Convention to find that Article 3 was written in a broad manner and in
contradistinction from Article 2. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31.
134. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 89, at art. 3.
135. Id. at art. 3(l)(d).
136. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631-33. The opinion by Justice Stevens goes on to
consider whether the military commissions afforded "all the judicial guarantees"
recognized by civilize people. Id. at 629. However, because Justice Kennedy did not
join in this part it did not represent the opinion of the court. See id. at 633-35.
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Geneva Convention was judicially enforceable of its own accord. 137 By
applying the Convention via incorporation through a domestic statute,
the Court invited legislative action to foreclose this possibility in the
future. 
138
At the same time, Hamdan did rely on international humanitarian
law, albeit in a circuitous manner, to vindicate individual rights. 139 The
Court's failure to find the Convention self-executing and judicially
enforceable might be understood as an exercise of judicial restraint. It is
possible that future events may eventually force the Court to address this
issue in a direct manner.
V. THE CURRENT STATUS
Partially in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Hamdan, the U.S. Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of
2006.140 This legislation contained a broad spectrum of measures
requested by the Bush Administration. At its centerpiece, the Act
authorized the establishment of military commissions by the President to
try "alien unlawful enemy combatants" 142 and provided regulations for
their operation. 143  The Act also purported to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions brought on behalf of enemy
combatants.'"
Following passage of the Military Commissions Act, numerous
organizations across the ideological spectrum called on Congress to
repeal the Act in its entirety. 145 In 2008, the United States Supreme
137. See id. at 635.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 613-35.
140. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. at 2608-09.
141. See Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill
Backed by Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092800824.html.
142. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. at 2602.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 2635.
145. Groups such as Human Rights First, The John Birch Society, Amnesty
International, and the American Civil Liberties Union all criticized the Military
Commissions Act and advocated for its repeal. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO
CLOSE GUANTANAMO 9 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/
080818-USLS-gitmo-blueprint.pdf, The John Birch Society; New Bill to Repeal Military
Commissions Act in House, http://www.jbs.org/index.php/jbs-news-feed/1 172-new-bill-
to-repeal-military-commissions-act-in-hous, (last visited Sep. 20, 2009); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE DELAYED AND JUSTICE DENIED? AMR 51/044/2007(2007),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/044/2007/en/dom-AMR
510442007en.pdf; ACLU Launches Constitution Voter Campaign To Restore Lost
Liberties In '08, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/36810prs20O809l7.html. In late
2007, legislation was introduced to repeal the Military Commission Act in its entirety.
American Freedom Agenda Act of 2007, H.R. 3835, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
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Court found unconstitutional the provision of the Act stripping federal
courts of the power to grant habeas corpus review to detainees in
Boumediene v. Bush.146 On January 20, 2009, newly-elected President
Barack Obama suspended prosecutions before military commissions
pursuant to the Act 147 and issued an executive order to close the
Guantdnamo Bay facility.
148
Despite these developments, however, the majority of the Military
Commissions Act remains in force. One of the most troubling surviving
provisions is broadly directed at the use of the Geneva Conventions. It
reads:
No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols
thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to
which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee,
member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a
party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its
States or territories.
149
This provision is not limited to enemy combatants or Guantdnamo Bay
detainees. Instead, it purports to any prohibit individuals from relying on
the Geneva Conventions in all civil cases and habeas corpus proceedings
involving the government. It is important to note, however, that this
provision does ban a person from invoking the Geneva Conventions in
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl 10-3835. This bill, introduced by
Representative Ron Paul, a Texas Republican, was referred to the House Subcommittee
on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. See id. The stated purpose of the
bill was to "restore the Constitution's checks and balances and protections against
government abuses as envisioned by the Founding Fathers." Id. at § 2(b). No
meaningful action was taken on the bill. See generally id.
146. See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2274.
147. See Peter Finn, Obama Seeks Halt to Legal Proceedings at Guantnamo, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2009, at A2.
148. Executive Order-Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the
Guantknamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No.
13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities/ [hereinafter Executive Order
GuantAnamo Bay Closure]. The order called for closure of the facility "as soon as
practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order." Id. As of late
September 2009, Guantdnamo Bay was still being used as a detention facility, although
the Justice Department announced that some former detainees were being transferred to
other countries. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRANSFERS THREE GUANTANAMO
BAY DETAINEES TO FOREIGN NATIONS, Sept. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.usdojwhitehouse.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-l035.html. In a
September 27, 2009, interview, Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that it was
"going to be tough" to meet the January 22, 2010, deadline for closure set by the
executive order. This Week (ABC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2009) available at
http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/09/gates-on-closing-gitmo-its-going-to-take-a-
little-longer.html.
149. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. at 2631.
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federal criminal proceedings, which the Obama Administration has
considered as an alternative venue to military commissions.' 50
A related provision in the Military Commissions Act does apply to
criminal prosecutions if they occur before military commissions.15 ' This
narrower restriction states that "no alien unlawful enemy combatant
subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights. ' 152  While military
commission trials have been suspended by President Obama since taking
office, it appears that the administration may yet resume prosecutions
before restructured military commissions, 153 thereby implicating this
provision.
These provisions have the potential to significantly impact the use
of the Geneva Conventions by American courts while they remain in
force. Salim Hamdan's success before the Supreme Court was a product
of his reliance on rights conveyed by the Conventions. 154 There can be
no doubt that the Congressional intent was to statutorily undo the basis
for Hamdan's legal victory.
155
It should be acknowledged that the validity of these provisions is
not certain. Scholars have argued that as long as the United States is a
party to the Geneva Conventions, legislative attempts to restrict its
enforceability under domestic law may be limited by the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution and the nature of the treaty.1 56 Moreover, it
should be considered that the guarantees relied on in Hamdan may be
available via customary humanitarian law even if reliance on the Geneva
Conventions is limited by the Act. As demonstrated, the United States
Supreme Court has a long history of applying and enforcing customary
humanitarian law.1 57  Although these cases have not involved the
150. See Finn, supra note 147.
151. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. at 2602.
152. Id. at 2602.
153. President Obama announced a 120-day suspension of the trials upon taking
office. See Finn, supra note 147. Trials were again suspended in May 2009 at the
request of the government. See Christian Ehret, Military Judge Grants Government
Motion to Delay Guantanamo Case, JURIST, May 20, 2009, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/05/military-judge-grants-govemment-motion.
php. On September 21, 2009, prosecutors requested another two-month delay to allow
Attorney General Eric Holder time to decide whether the government will proceed with
military or civilian criminal trials. See Carol Rosenberg, Guantnamo Judge Delays 9/11
Case Until Nov. 16, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/guantanamo/story/1245120.html.
154. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613.
155. Seeid. at710-11.
156. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Military Commissions Act of 2006: The Military
Commissions Act, The Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J.
INT'L L. 73, 88-94 (2007).
157. See supra, Part II.
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assertion of individual rights, the Court has recognized that it can find a
cause of action based in specific and universal norms of international
law. 1
58
It is widely accepted that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions is declaratory of customary international law. 159  As
discussed above, Article 3 provides important minimum standards for
military trials of any kind.1 60  These include judgment by "a regularly
constituted court" and the availability of "all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'
161
Although these standards are set forth in the Conventions, they are also a
part of customary humanitarian law. Therefore, they are arguably a part
of American law even if reliance on the Conventions is prohibited by
legislation.
It is, of course, possible that the remaining sections of the Military
Commissions Act will still be repealed or amended through the political
process. During his inaugural address, President Obama reiterated the
fundamental role of the rule of law and international cooperation. 62 This
presumably includes fulfilling the American obligation to "respect and to
ensure respect for 163 the Geneva Conventions 64 However, repeal of the
remaining provisions of the Act may be less of a priority now that plans
have been announced to close the Guantdnamo Bay detention facility.
1 65
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the law of
war as a part of international law. 1 66 During this long history only a
handful of the Court's cases have involved individual rights conferred by
158. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004).
159. See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT-101, Decision on Motion on
Lack of Jurisdiction 24 (May 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Case No. IT-0 1-
47, Decision on Command Responsibility, 13 (July 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, 72 (Aug. 10, 1995);
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (Common Article 3 rules represent
"elementary considerations of humanity"). See also Theodor Meron, Revival of
Customary Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 831 (2005); Jordan Paust,
Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment
and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 816 (2005).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
161. See supra Part IV.
162. See President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/ [hereinafter Obama Inaugural
Address].
163. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 89, at art. 1.
164. See generally Obama Inaugural Address, supra note 162. See, e.g., Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 89, at art. 1.
165. See Executive Order Guantdnamo Bay Closure, supra note 148.
166. See supra Parts 11-III.
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humanitarian law.167 In the most recent of these cases, the Court relied
on conventional humanitarian law to invalidate the convening of a
military commission at Guantdinamo Bay.168  The Court did not,
however, directly address the relationship between international
humanitarian law and domestic law, nor did it definitively state whether
the Geneva Conventions are judicially enforceable. 169
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 subsequently foreclosed
reliance on the Geneva Conventions in American courts. While the
suspension of prosecutions before military commissions has made this
issue less pressing, the relevant provisions remain in force, damaging
American credibility and presenting a real obstacle in the event that
reliance on the Geneva Conventions becomes necessary in the assertion
of individual rights in American courts. While the constitutionality of
these provisions will likely be challenged if future prosecutions occur,
the repeal of the Military Commission Act would render this a moot
point.
167. See supra Parts II-Ill.
168. See generally Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
169. See generally id.

